INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a worldwide revival of interest in fiscal decentralization. The so-called "countries in transi-*Unwersity of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 207 tion" of eastern Europe, for example, are busily setting up new systems of local and intergovernmental finance (Bird and Wallich, 1993) . Many developing countries are turning to various forms of fiscal decentralization as one way of escaping from the traps of ineffective and inefficient governance, macroeconomic instability, and inadequate economic growth in which so many of them have become mired in recent years.' Similar, if less dramatic, pressures are at work in developed economies attempting to reshape their intergovernmental fiscal structure to be more in tune with the realities of the "postwelfare state" era (Bennett, 1990) .' At one extreme, the threat of national disintegration has led Canadians to focus as never before on such traditional Issues as tax assignment (Ip and Mintz, 1991) as well as on the broader political and economic aspects of federalism.3 In Europe, new federal states are emerging (Spain, Belgium), and decentralization is being studied extensively even in such centralized countries as the United Kingdom and France (Bennett, 1990) . The latest "new federalism" in the United States has resulted in increased attention to such concepts as fiscal competition (Kenyon and Kincaid, 1991) and fiscal equalization.4
Issues of fiscal decentralization, broadly conceived, are thus in the air everywhere--and, indeed, are already on the ground in many different guises in different parts of the world. Economic theorists are theorizing about fiscal decentralization, applied economists are attempting to pin it down in numbers, and policy economists are busily flying around the world dispensing advice about it.!' But lust what is meant by fiscal decentralization? What advice does the academic literature suggest should be given? And IIOW does this advice relate to what is actually taking place in the real world?
Although I cannot answer such broad questions here, this paper is intended to provide some guidance to policy advisers and researchers who wish to find their way through the fiscal labyrinth of local and intergovernmental finance in any country. I focus on a few issues that have turned out to be important in my experience as a policy economist who has worked on various aspects of fiscal decentralization in a variety of different settings over the years.6
The paper is organrzed in three main sections. First, I discuss what fiscal decentralization is and1 why it is a matter of policy concern. Second, one critical decision invariably concerns the revenue-raising powers of local governments.' I consider briefly some factors, affecting the choice of local revenues, with particular attention to the neglected case for user charges and the relative merits of local property and income taxes. Finally, in many ways, the design of transfer systems lies at the heart of centrallocal relations. I discuss several issues in transfer design in the last section, with particular emphasis on the case for conditional but eclualizing transfers.
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION:
WHAT AND WHY "Fiscal decentralization" seems often to mean whatever the person using the term wants it to mean. Broadly speaking, however, two quite different approaches may be taken to the concept. One views decentralization from the top down. The stimulus may be, for example, to make the life of the central government easier by shifting deficits (or at least some of the political pressures resulting from deficits) downward.* Or it may be a desire on the part of the central government to achieve its allocative goals more efficiently by delegating or decentralizing authority to local governments.g An additional #goal may (or may not) be to increase the level of national welfare. In any case, this top-down approach suggests that the main criterion for evaluating fiscal decentralization should be how well it serves the presumed national policy objectives.
In contrast, the second approach to fiscal decentralization is from the bottom up. This approach stresses both political values-improved governance in the sense of local responsiveness and political participation, for example-and, again, allocative efficiency. Sometimes efficiency is explicitly defined in terms of improving welfare--the "decentralization theorem" of Oates (1972) , for example, or the broader notion of increased scope for dynamic Innovation that may be traced back to the Federalist papers. In other Instances, such less individualistic concepts as "local autonomy" and "accountability" may be brought into play. Whatever the specifics of such "localist" arguments-ancl the variations are infinite, as Prud'homme ('1991) and Dafflon (1992) emphasize in different ways-the appropriate criterion for evaluating fiscal decentralization differs sharply from that in the top-down approach.
A first problem in analyzing any aspect of fiscal decentralization in a specific setting is' therefore to determiine whether a "good" ftscal decentralization is one which better achieves the goals 0.f the central government (or improves national welfare as a whole, if one prefers) or one which frees I SYMPOSIUM ON FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION local governments most from central dictates (or, if one prefers, improves local welfare most). Decentralization may have many virtues: it may, for instance, improve accessibility, local responsibility, and the effectiveness of government. But it is not likely to produce exactly the expenditure pattern the central government would choose to implement except in the unlikely case that the goals of central and local government precisely coincide. In a heterogeneous society, as a rule, it is not possible for the central government to have its cake (decentralize decision-making to local governments) and eat it too (have the same decisions made). Conflicts between central and local governments as to what should be done are inevitable even if each government tries faithfully to serve the interests of its (different) constituents. A choice of perspective is thus essential in approaching issues of fiscal decentralization.
Federal Finance and Fiscal Federalism
Another way to approach the critical issue of whose preferences dominate is to distinguish between two varieties of fiscal decentralization, which may be loosely labeled federal finance and fiscal federalism.
In "federal finance," as I define it, jurisdictional boundaries and the assignment of functions and finances are basically taken as fixed at some earlier "constitutional" stage and not open to further discussion in normal circumstances. Moreover, the degree of fiscal and regulatory harmonization attained and, for that matter, the degree to which an internal common market exists are matters to be determined jointly by both levels of government in some appropriate political (constitutional) forum rather than simply assuming consensus on these goals exists (Bird, 1989) . In addition, both levels of government may properly pursue their own distributive policies (Tresch, 1981) , again with no presumption of central dominance. In this federal setting, intergovernmental transfers are often both 209 equalizing and unconditional, as, for example, Shah (1991) emphasizes. Finally, the appropriate analytical framework is essentially a bargaining situation between principals-what one Canadian author (Srmeon, 1972) has called "federal-provincial diplomacy." In some countries (Canada, Switzerland), this may not be a bad description of federal-state relations (Dafflon, 1992; Bird, 1986) . It is not, however, the world I want to discuss here.
That world is instead the traditional world of "fiscal federalism" or "multilevel finance," as set out by Oates (1972) . In this framework, in principle, everythingboundaries, assignments, the level and nature of transfers, etc.-is up for grabs. Moreover, the central government's policy preferences are clearly dominant (in practice, if not so clearly in theory). The appropriate analytical framework in this setting is clearly a principal-agent model in which the principal (the central government) may alter jurisdictional boundaries, local government revenue and expenditure responsibilities, and intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in its attempt to overcome the familiar agency problems of information asymmetry and differing objectives between principal and agent."
Of course, many qualifications might be introduced to soften or modify the dichotomy sketched earlier. For example, as political scientists emphasize, the central function of government is not simply to deliver services, as economists tend to stress, but also to manage conflict-and a central way in which governments everywhere manage conflict is through distributive policy. Indeed, a government, whether "local" or central, that is not concerned with distribution is not so much a government as a particular organizational structure for delivering certain services.
Nonetheless, partly in the interest of brevity and partly because I do not consider it critical in the fiscal federalism model (as in-terpreted here), the distributive aspect of local finances is not considered further in the present paper. In practice, the principal manifestation of distributional concern at the local level is often through the free provision of public services; a secondary aspec:t is concern for the distributional effect of local revenues. l"hese two drstributional factors combine perniciously to bias many against local user charges, as noted later. They ZIISO have long bedeviled discussion of local general taxes. Since my approach to the fiscal federalism model is, in essence, to view local governments as a firm (club), I set these aspects aside in order to concentrate on what I argue is the main, allocatlve task of local government: to give its constituents what they want and are willing to pay for. In addition, of course, as many have noted, the ability of small governments to effect distributional goals in an lapen economy is very limited." I emphasize--indeed, exaggerate-the contrast between these two quite different "models" of fiscal decentralization for two reasons. First, it is critical to distinguish these two broad approaches in principle because the implications for policy design that follow .from them are very different, especially with respect to the design of intergovernmental transfers, as discussed later." Second, in my judgement, except for central-state relations in a relatively few "truly federai" states, it is the second approach--fiscal federalism--that is the right way to analyze fisc:aI decentralization issues in most cases.'3
Since almost all of the academic literature on decentralization already adopts this approach, this appears to be good news for the policy analyst. Unfortunately, in practice, that literature offers surprisingly little guidance to some of the key questions that arise with respect to fiscal decentralization. Economic analysis, like democratic theory, does provide a strong rationale for the establishment of local governments that are responsive to the wishes of their citizens instead of being simply the instrurnentalities of central planners. People have different preferences for public servicessome may be more concerned with good roads and others with good schools, for example. Moreover, many services (including roads and schools) are consumed in a spatially differentiated pattern. It seems to follow from these facts that the most efficien t allocation of public sector resources can be secured only if such services are provided (and paid for) by governments responsible to those most directly affected.
Unfortunately, the apparent strength simplicity of this conclusion dissipates and quickly when other considerations, economic and political, are taken into account. The existence of benefit and cost ' 'spillovers" frorn one jurisdiction to another, for example, suggests that larger governmental units are needed to internalize such externalities. Moreover, the unit cost of collecting revenues from most lucrative tax sources IS much less for national than for local governments. On the other hand, as Buchanan and Tullolck (1962) demonstrated, the cost of political decision-making (in terms of the nonsatisfaction of preferences) rises as the population covered expands Little is known of most of the relc?vant magnitudes, but the extreme variation in the spatial dimension of virtually every governmental function and subfunction suggests that the "optimal" government structure is likely to be as complex in theory as it is in practice in most countries (Bird and tiartle, 1972) .14 Even if theory provided a clearer guide to either the design of jurisdictional boundaries or the assignment of taxes, and expenditures, the role played by local governments in practice in any country is, of course, primarily determined by the extent to which central governments choose, for reasons of adlministrative efficiency or political choice, to utilize such governments as taxing and, especially, spending agents. In this respect, perhaps the main practical guidance emerging from the theoretical literature may be argued to be the benefit model of local finance."
The Benefit Model of Local Finance
The basic rule of efficient expenditure assignment is to assign each function to the lowest level of government consistent with its efficient performance. So long as there are local variations in tastes and costs, there are clearly efficiency gains from carrying out public sector activities in as decentralized a fashion as possible.'6 The only services that should be provided centrally are those for which there are no differences in demands in different localities, where there are substantial spillovers between jurisdictions that cannot be handled in some other way (e.g., by contracting or by grant design), or for which the additional costs of local administration are sufficiently higher to outweigh its advantages. In short, leaving aside the important distributive question, almost all public services (except national defence, foreign policy, and a surprisingly few others) should probably be delivered at the local level, with local decision makers deciding what services are provided, to whom, and in what quantity and quality and with local taxpayers paying for the services provided."
In practice, although there are some functions (e.g., maintenance of streets) that are local everywhere, the allocation of functions to local governments varies considerably from country to country, with the principal differentiating factor apparently being the extent to which local governments are given an independent (as opposed to executing) role with respect to primary education. '* Since the United States lies at one end of the spectrum in this respect, it is not surprising so much American discussion of local and intergovernmental finance is really about education finance.
In any case, the essential economic role of local government is to provide to local residents those public services for which they are willing to pay. Local governments must be accountable to their citizens for the actions they undertake at least to the extent those citizens finance those actions. Accountability is the public sector equivalent of the "bottom line" in the private sector. Accountability, in this sense, clearly requires that local governments should, whenever possible, charge for the services they provide, and, where charging is impracticable, they should finance such services from taxes borne by local residents except to the extent that the central government is, for reasons such as those mentioned previously, willing to pay for them. Where the central government does pay, local governments should be accountable to the central government to the extent the services they provide are financed by transfers. Public sector activities are unlikely to be provided efficiently unless the lines of responsibility and accountability are clearly established in these ways.
In principle, local governments should not only have access to those revenue sources that they are best equipped to exploitsuch as residential property taxes and user charges for local services-but they should also be both encouraged and permitted to exploit these sources without undue central supervision. Unless local governments are given some degree of freedom with respect to local revenues, including the freedom to make mistakes (for which they are accountable to their citizens), the development of responsible and responsive local government will remain an unattainable mirage.
There are, of course, dangers in permitting local governments even limited freedom. One danger in the eyes of some is that they will not utilize fully all the revenue sources open to them, thus allowing the level and quality of public services to deteriorate below the standard considered desirable, at least by those who think this way. But this is not a real problem. If the service in question is one of national importance (e.g., research) or one in which there is a strong n&ional interest in maintaining standards (e.g., poverty alleviation or some other distributional goal), it shoulcl be nationally funded at least in part and its achievement monitored. If it is not a matter of national interest, why should the national government be concerned? If the local electors do not like what their local government does, or does not do, they can (try to) throw the rascals out at the next electior~.'g The freedom to make mistakes and toi bear the consequences of one's mistakes is an important component of local autonomy.
Another danger, more salient from an economic persplective, I~s that local governments may attempt to extract revenues from sources for which they are not accountable, thus obviating the basic efficiency argument for their existence. "Tax exporting," like benefit spillovers, generally requires central intervention if local governments are to operate efficiently. Although some local taxation of business may, of course, be warranted on "benefit" grounds, as noted subsequently, it is thus often desirable to limit local government access to taxes that, in many instances, may be presumed to fall mainly on nonresidents, such as most natural resource levies, preretail stage sales taxes, and, to (some extent, nonresidential real property taxes. 2o
LOCAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUES User Charges
The first rule of local finance should be: "'Wherever possible, charge." For efficiency, charges should be levied on the direct recipients of benefits, whether residents, businesses, or "things" (real property).
While user charges are likely to be viewed by hard-pressed local officials solely as a potential adclitional source of revenue, their maln economic. value is to promote economrc efficiency by providing demand informatlon to public sector suppliers and to ensure that what the local public sector supplies is valued at least at (marginal) cost by citizens. This efficiency objective is particularly important at the local government level, since the main economic rationale for local government in the first place in the perspective adopted here is to Improve efficiency. Whenever possible, local public services should therefore be charged of course, at properly set prices (Bird for-1976 )~--rather than given away. AttemptIng to rectify fundamental distributional problems through inefficiently pricing scarce local resources is almost always a bad idea, resulting in little, if any, equity being purchased ciency terms.2' at a high price in effiAlthough in most countries much less use 1s made (of charging at the local level than seems desirable and many of the charges that are levied are poorly designed from an efficiency point of view, at least three types of local "charge" revenue exist almost everywhere: (1) service fees, (2) public prices, and (3) specific benefir: charges.
By "servtce fees" I mean license fees (marnage, business, dog, vehicle) and various small charges levied by local governments essentially for performing specifilc services-registering this or providing a copy of that---for identifiable individuals. Charging people for something they are required by law to clo may not always be sensiblefor example, if the benefit of (say) registering birth:, or deaths IS general and the cost is specific--but, on the whole, there is seldom much harm, or much revenue, in thus recovering the cost of providing the service in queston
In contrast, by "public prices" I mean the revenues received by local governments from the sale of private goods and services (other than the cost reimbursement just described). In principle, prices of locally 212 provided services to identifiable private individuals-whether public utility charges or admission charges to recreation facilitiesshould be set at the competitive private level, with no special tax or subsidy element included.22
A final category of charge revenue is "specific benefit taxes." Unlike service fees and public prices, these revenues do not arise from the provision or sale of a specific good or service to an identifiable private individual. Unlike "prices" which are voluntarily paid-although like "fees" which are paid for services that may be required by law-taxes represent compulsory contributions to local revenues. Nonetheless, specific benefit taxes are (at least in theory) related in some way to benefits received by the taxpayer. In contrast to such general benefit taxes as fuel taxes levied on road users as a class or local taxes in general viewed as a price paid for local collective goods (discussed later), specific benefit taxes relate to the specific benefits supposedly received by specific taxpayers.
Examples abound in local finance: special assessments, land value increment taxes, improvement taxes, front footage levies, supplementary property taxes related to the provision of sewers or streetlighting, development exactions and charges, delineation levies, and so on. Most such charges are imposed either on the assessed value of real property, changes in that value, or some characteristic of that property (its area, its frontage, its location).
The importance of all these forms of charging is, in principle, much greater than the relatively small amounts of money generally collected from this variegated group of levies. To the extent that a local government is viewed primarily as a provider of services, as was suggested previously, and the benefits of those services can be attributed specifically to individual citizens, properties, or businesses (or small groups), the appropriate policy is clearly to charge the 21 3 correct (roughly marginal cost) price. Only thus will the correct amounts and types of service be provided to the right people, that is, those willing to pay for them.
As much as there is to be said for charging for local services, however, experience to date in most countries is not very encouraging. Even where the common philosophical objections to pricing in the public sector can be overcome, the prices charged are seldom those needed for efficiency. The potential for improved user charge finance as a means of financing local government thus remains more potential than reality.23 In practice, the most important decisions in local government finance thus inevitably concern the design and implementation of local taxes and intergovernmental transfers, the subjects of the balance of this paper.
What is a Local Tax?
In the first place, a "truly local" tax might be defined as one that is (1) assessed by a local government, (2) at rates decided by that government, (3) collected by that government, and (4) whose proceeds accrue to that government. In reality, however, taxes often possess only one or two of these characteristics.
For example, the proceeds of an income or sales tax may accrue in whole or in part to local governments, but tax rates are set by the central government, which also assesses and collects the tax. This situation is common in many countries with so-called "shared" taxes. In many ways, such a shared tax is more like a central government grant allocated to local governments either in proportion to the amount of central income tax collected locally or in accordance with some (centrally determined) formula.
On the other hand, what looks like a central tax and a related transfer program may really be a local tax. Some intergovernmental transfers, for example, in effect simply return taxes to the regions in which they were collected in the first place. If the local government determines the tax base and rate and receives all the revenues, the only role the central government plays is as a collection agent, presumably because it has ,a comparative advantage in tax collection and the local government has contracted for its services in this respect. In this case, there is no intergovernmental transfer at all, except in the narrowest accounting sense.
While it is thus sometimes difficult to figure out just what are local taxes, it can be argued that the most important characteristic of a local tax is the freedom of the local government to determine the tax rate. Local governments may have large receipts from what appear to be local taxes, but if they can neither set the tax rate nor determine the tax base, it is difficult to see how they can be accountable to their consituents at the margin, as both democracy and efficiency require.
Characteristics of a Good Local Tax
The characteristics lo be sought in an "ideal" local tax from the point of view of local and central governments are not necessarily compatible. A partial listing might include the following.
(1). The tax base should be immobile to allow local authorities some leeway in varying rates without the tax base vanishing.
(2). The tax yield should be adequate to meet local needs and sufficiently buoyant (i.e., expand at least as fast as expendrtures) over time.
(3). The tax yield should be stable and predictable over time.
(4). The tax should be perceived to be reasonably fair by taxpayers.
(5). The tax should be easy to administer efficiently and effectively.
(6). It should not be possible to export much, if any, of the tax burden to nonresidents.
(7). The tax base should be visible to ensure accountability.
Both levels of government may agree on the first five of these characteristics, but only the central government is likely to be concerned about the last two.
More generally, not everyone would agree that all these characteristics are necessarily desirable, e.g., is it unequivocably good that local governments should be insulated from either the tax base consequences of their tax rate choices or from inflation (Oates, 1975) ? In reality, since central governments, set the rules and generally take the best-yielding taxes for their own use, as a rule, local governrnents are unlikely to have sufficient access to tax sources to free them from some dependence on transfers. Nonetheless, unless local governments have some degree of freedom to alter the level and composition of their revenues, neither "local autonomy" nor local accountability is a meaningful concept. In particular, as emphasized earlier, rate flexibility is essential if a tax is to be adequately responsive to local needs and decisions.
The Choice of Local Taxes
The purpose of local taxes is to finance locally provided collective public goods for local residents. If such goods are truly "public" in the sense of accruing equally to all residents of the jurisdiction and if redistribution to other than national standards is not an aim of local public policy and if admlnistrative (and compliance) costs are left out of account, the best source of local revenue might Iperhaps be an equal per capita levy, such as the poll tax, which also has the virtue of being economically neutral or efficient in the sense of giving rise to no excess burden.
In practice, however, local poll taxes that differ from place to place are easy to evade by moving. Even those who do not flee may be hard to tax: the low efficiency costs of the poll tax seem likely to be pur-214 chased at the expense of high administrative and compliance costs (Smith, 1991) . Moreover, since some residents-propertyowners, people with school-age children, or whoever-benefit more than others from the provision of local public services, there may be reason for some local residents to pay more than others.
If the demand for local public services is income-elastic, a benefit case can be made for a local income tax or, more feasibly, given the high administrative costs of separate local income taxes, a local surcharge on the central income tax. If the enjoyment of such services is associated with consumption (rather than residence), a benefit case can similarly be made for a local tax on consumption, which would in practice almost certainly have to take the form of a retail sales tax. And, finally, if the benefits of local public services are enjoyed in proportion to the value of real property, there is obviously a case for a local property tax.
Local Property Taxes
In practice, the property tax remains the main source of revenue for local governments in a number of countries, particularly, of course, the English-speaking countries in which it has been well-established historically (Bird and Slack, 1991) . Moreover, there are good reasons for taxing real property. A tax on real property may, for example, make good sense as part of the tax system as a whole: although relatively expensive to administer, in many ways, the property tax scores quite well in terms of both its efficiency and its equity aspects. Moreover, if levied at the local level, a property tax may, as noted earlier, serve as a good means of financing local public services.
Nonetheless, as experience in a number of countries has shown in recent years, there is often widespread resistance to property taxation. The recent poll tax ("community charge") fiasco in the United Kingdom, 215 which, like the earlier "Proposition 13" movement in the United States, originated initially as a reaction to rising property taxes, Illustrates the strength and political importance of the resistance to property taxes in some countries, as well as the fact that not all possible replacements are necessarily desirable, or desired! Dislike of the property tax (like the poll tax) seems to result in part from the visibility of the tax and in part from certain inherent problems in Its administration.
Local taxes on real property are more visible than other taxes for several reasons. First, unlike the income tax, the property tax is not deducted at source but often has to be paid directly to the municipality by taxpayers in periodic lump-sum payments. Taxpayers who pay taxes directly to the government tend to be more aware of the size of their tax bill than those whose take-home pay is reduced by weekly or monthly tax deductions. The need to make periodic large payments may well add to the accountability and responsibility of local governments, but it also increases the sensitivity of taxpayers to even nominal increases in taxes.
Second, the inelasticity of the property tax has a similar effect. Since the base of this tax does not as a rule increase automatically over time, the periodic nominal increases in property tax bills needed to maintain real revenues when price levels rise require increased tax rates.24 In terms of political accountability, this need to confront the people with the cost of government again represents a virtue of the property tax. Again, however, the downside is the heightened visibility of nominal tax increases and the accompanying political resistance.
Third, local property taxes, of course, finance such municipal services as roads, garbage collection, and (in some countries) education. The quantity and quality of these services (or their absence) is thus readily llnketl to the property tax. When potholes develop in their streets, taxpayers are understandably quick to question the taxes that supposedly finance street repair.2" Once again, the very feature that makes the property tax a good source of local government revenue in principle makes it especially vulnerable to political resistance.
Other problems result from property tax administration. As a rule, property is supposed to be assessed on the basis of its market value, usually defined as the price struck between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm's length transaction. In reality, however, for both political and technical reasons, discrepancies usually arise between assessed 'values and market values within classes of property, between classes of property, and across municipalities. Since taxpayers can easily compare their property taxes with those of similar properties in their neighborhood, such discrepancies lead both to specific assessment appeals and to general [pressure for tax relief.
in sum, experience (suggests that there are (at least two substantial constraints on the use of property taxes for local finance. First, although the (administration of the tax can be irnproved, it IS difficult to administer in a Ihorizontally equitable fashion, particularly when prices are changing rapidly. It will therefore always be hard to levy very heavy taxation on this base. Indeed, international experience suggests that lheavy reliance by local governments on the property tax rneans they will continue to be heavily dependent on intergovernmental grants, to finance their activities (Bird and !Yack, 199 1) !,econd, the temptation to indulge in politically painless but economically Inefficient (from a national perspective) "tax exporting" means that some constraint should Ideally be placed on local taxation of nonresldeirltial property (Thirsk, 1982) . While there is much to be said for local taxes on residential property, there is little case for allowing local governments a free hand in taxing business, whether such taxes take the form of the nonresidential property tax, corporate incomle taxes, or local "business" taxes based on gross sales, type of business activity, or other indicators. Some such levies may, of course, be justified on benefit (efficiency) grounds-as well as, more arguably, on "entitlement" grounds (Musgrave, 1983) ~but they should always be strictly constrained in order to preclude localities from attempting to shift the costs of services to outsiders.
Local Income Taxes
The principal alternative (or supplement) to property taxes is some form of local income tax, generally levied as a supplement to national income taxes.26 Since property taxes can only be pushed so far, if more local "own-source" revenue is desiredeither to expand the size of local activities or to make local governments more self-reliant--there is much to be said for supplementary ("piggybacked") local income taxes. Indeed, if a country wants its local governments to be both large spenders and less dependent on grants, it must, it appears, provide them with access to the personal income tax, probably in the form of locally established surcharges on the national income tax (or, if a different degree of progressivity is desired, local rates on the national tax base).
Like the property tax, such a tax would be visible and, hence, in principle satisfy the criteria of political responsibility and accountablllty.27 However, the fact that income tax revenues tend to grow with less political fuss, while presumably good news for local officials, suggests that in practice increased reliance on local income taxes should be viewed with mixed feelings. On the other hand, since an income tax is usually perceived as more progressive than a property tax, it scores higher than the 216 National Tax Journal Vol. 46, no. 2, (June, 1993), pp. 207-27 I SYMPOSIUM ON FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION latter on equity grounds-although, as emphasized earlier, the relevance of this in the local context is arguable.
The principal argument against local income taxation is administrative, but a properly designed "piggyback" system can readily handle this problem. Most of the other arguments raised against such taxes have no merit. For example, contentions that local income taxes necessarily induce inefficient fiscal competition or inefficient resource allocation are at best incomplete and in general misleading. In line with the benefit model of local government, local taxes simply constitute the price of local public services and (provided they are not exported) have no adverse effects on resource allocation or on fiscal competition. On the contrary, their allocative effects are desirable, as is the competition they may induce in lower cost provision of desired public services.28 If the functions local governments are supposed to carry out are important and the case for financing them from local taxes strong, international experience suggests strongly that local income taxes are the most promising source of local finance (Bird and Slack, 1991) .
THE DESIGN OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
Almost irrespective of local revenue sources, transfers between central and local governments are an important feature of the public finances of many countries. A well-designed system of intergovernmental transfers is thus essential to any decentralization strategy. Unfortunately, the traditional literature on fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972) , which emphasizes interjurisdictional externalities, both fails to explain most of the transfers found in the real world and makes impossible informational demands.*'
No simple, uniform pattern of transfers will be suitable for all circumstances. Since one size will not fit all, the first task of the fiscal tailor is to know as much as possible 217 about his client. As tailors know, for example, one should not place much credence in promises to lose weight-or, in this case, reduce expenditures! In particular, since transfers reflect closely the nature of a country's political system, their inherently political nature must be taken into account without being hamstrung by it. One way to do so is simple, if somewhat artificial: focus on the effects rather than on the instruments used to achieve them. In this perspective, transfers as such are neither good nor bad: what matters are their effects on such policy outcomes as allocative efficiency, distributional equity, and macroeconomic stability. If, for example, the sole objective of fiscal decentralization is the efficient delivery of public services, as I suggest should be the initial assumption of economic analysts (other than in federal finance settings), all that matters is how transfers affect the effectiveness and efficiency of public sector operations.
What is critical about intergovernmental transfers is thus not who gives them, or who gets them, or what the details of program design are, but solely their effects on policy objectives.30 The idea is thus simply to "get the prices right" in the public sector in the sense of making local governments accountable to their citizens for the actions they undertake, to the extent those citizens finance those actions, and to taxpayers in general, to the extent the finance comes from transfers.3' This focus on results suggests some significant characteristics that desirable transfer programs are likely to possess whatever the context. In terms of process, for example, good transfers should be both transparent and predictable and should also accommodate the diversity of the country in question.
Since local governments should be accountable to the central government to the extent they are financed by transfers, in this model, there is no role for completely unconditional transfers.3' As argued earlier, this principal-agent .framework (as opposed to a local autonomy model) seems to describe the reality of central-local fiscal relations in most nonfederal countries and state-Ilocal rellations even in federal countries. Local governments can and should rnake decisions on such matters as bus routes and when and how often the garbage is collected, but they should not, if education and health are matters of national interest, be free to decide (with central funds) who gets educated or whether local health c:are centers should be provided even if such functions are, for efficiency or other reasons, carried out at the local level.
The implications of this approach for the design of trarnsfers may be further illustrated by considering the basic tasks assigned to tralrlsfers in most fiscal systems: closing the fiscal gap, equalization, pricing externalities, stretching the central budget, and achieving political objectives.
Closing the Fiscal (Gap
As a rule, transfers constitute the principal way ini which countries achieve what is sometimes called "vertical fiscal balance," that is, ensure that the revenues and expenditures of each level of government are approximately equal. For various reasons, both economic and political, central governments usually have much greater revenue-raising capacity than do local governments. Intergovernmental transfers are one mechanism by which some of the revenues accruing to the center are transferred to finance the deficits of lower levels of government.33 Although all transfers from higher level to lower level governments help close the fiscal gap, it is useful to consider vertical fiscal balance in an accounting sense as achieved when expenditures and revenues [Including transfers) are balanced for the richest local government, measured in terms of its capacity to raise resources on its own."" Fiscal gaps will still remain for all poorer local governments, but such "gaps" are bettel. considered in relation to the problem of achieving horizontal fiscal balance (within the local government sector).
Equalization
Horizontal fiscal balance or equalization, as it is usually called, is controversial not least because, like decentralization itself, it is a concept with many different interpretations. For example, if horizontal fiscal balance is interpreted in the same "gap-frlling" sense as vertical fiscal balance, what is implied is that sufficient transfers are needed to equalize revenues (including transfers) and the acilual expenditures of each local government Such "fiscal dentistry" makes no sense, however. Equalizing the actual outlays of local govclrnments in per capita terms (i.e., raising all to the level of the richest local government), like making up all gaps between ac:.ual outlays and actual ownsource revenues for all local governments, ignores dfferences in local preferences. Moreover, from the perspective of the central government, such equalization ignores local differences in needs, in costs, and in own reveliue-raising (capacity. Finally, equalizing actual outlays discourages both local reverlue-raising effort and local expenditure restraint, since, under this system, those with the highest expenditures and the lowest taxes get the largest transfers.
For these reasons, in all countnes with formal systems of equalllzation transfers (for example, all developed country federations apart from the United States), the aim is either to equalize the capacity of local governments to provide a certain level of public service<; or to equalize the actual performance of this level of service by local governments. The pelrformance criterion, which adjusts the transfer received in accordance with the need for the aided service (and which may also allow for cost 218 National Tax Journal Vol. 46, no. 2, (June, 1993), pp. 207-27 differentials) , is generally more attractive to central governments: the level of service funded is determined centrally, and the transfer can be made conditional on the provision of that level of service. Unfortunately, unless an adjustment is made for differential fiscal capacity, that government which tries least again gets most.
Capacity equalization aims to provide each local government with sufficient funds (own-source revenues plus transfers) to deliver a (centrally) predetermined level of services.35 Because transfers are based on measures of potential revenue-raising capacity (such as taxable assessed values equalized to adjust for differences in the ratio of assessed to market values in different localities, or the so-called "representative tax system "36) and not on actual revenues, in principle, no disincentive to fiscal effort is created.
On the other hand, only if the standard revenue-raising capacity which the grant is intended to provide is set at the level of the richest local government will full horizontal fiscal balance (full equalization), as defined earlier in the sense of closing all gaps, be achieved. For any lower standard, such as the average revenue-raising capacity of local governments, the disabilities of below-average localities relative to those that are above average will obviously remain.37
In this framework, the basic case for an equalization transfer is twofold. First, as argued in Feldstein (1975) and the next section, such a transfer may be needed to enable poorer local governments to respond efficiently to central transfers intended to generate the correct level of externalities.
Second, it may also be needed to enable local governments, acting as agents of the central government, to provide an adequate "minimum bundle" of public services to citizens. Such transfers should, of course, not be unconditional but should rather be conditioned on both capacity and performance, in the sense of actually providing the specified package of services3* Both the incorporation of an appropriate measure of capacity in any general transfer formula and the implementation of an adequate central government system for monitoring local government performance are therefore essential to effective fiscal decentralization in this framework.3g
Getting Intergovernmental
Prices Right
The transfer rationale with the strongest basis in the economic literature is that the local activity in question may spill over to other jurisdictions. The correct matching rate is, in this approach, set by the size of the spillovers. Basically, a matching grant program designed to encourage the optimal provision of public services should therefore vary primarily with the nature of the activity, that is, depending on the level of associated externalities.
Since, however, no country has achieved full equalization of local fiscal capacities, a uniform matching level offering the same price to all local governments will yield nonuniform responses in rich and poor localities (Feldstein, 1975) . Even if revenue bases are fully equalized, need or cost differentials may require an equalization element in matching grant formulas. For example, per capita grants for roads in sparsely populated and mountainous regions may be larger (as in Switzerland, for example), because the per capita cost of achieving any particular standard of road service will obviously be higher.
The basic problem with the spillover approach to the design of matching grants, however, lies not in such concerns but in the simple fact that no one, anywhere, seems to have a good idea of the magnitude of spillovers associated with particular services. Indeed, there are few aspects of local government finance that seem more likely to repay careful empirical research. At present, the spillover argument appears to provide at most a rationale for central government support of some local expenditures: it almost never indicates how much support is needed, and a priori the required matching ratios found in practice (e.g., IO-20 percent) as a rule seem likely to be far too low for allocative efficiency.
Stretching the Central Budget
A quite different ratilonale for matching grants arises from the sirnple extstence of a central government budget constraint4' To maximize expenditure on any service, the (optimal way to allocate a given total transfer among localities is inversely related to the price elasticity of local demand for the 'service (assuming no cross-price elasticity (effects). In practice, however, it is almost as difficult to estimate the relevant price elasticities as to measure spillovers. All <:ransfers have income effects, and all grants for specific activities have price effects, but in reality we have little idea of the size of either the income or the price elasticities of demand for local public goods. 41
Nevertheless, as implied earlier (Feldstein, 1975) , it may often be useful for matching grants to be inversely correlated to the income level of the recipient government. This approach differs frorn the general equalization argument drscussed earlier for three reasons: (1) specific services are designated, perhaps because they are thought to entail spillovers or perhaps because they are considered especially meritorous; (2) the specific level of service to be provided is also established; and (3) the payment of the grant is conditioned on that level of the specified services in fact being provided. The higher the income elasticity, the higher the matching rate needed for lowitlcome recipients (to offset the higher local expenditures on the aided service in higher illcome areas). The higher the price elastici*:y, the lower the matching rate needed to achieve a given level of total expenditures. In practice, this analysis yields a case for varying the matching rate inversely with income levels even when only the allocative effects (and not the distributional effects) of matching grants are considered."* The matching rate for each prograrn may be thought of as having two components. The basic matching rate for each service reflects the degree of central government interest in the provision of that service (whether that interest is motivated by concern over spillavers, the "merit good" nature of the activity, or simply the desire to implement some plan). This basic rate could then be increasecl inversely to a uniformly determined measure of fiscal capacity.43 The matching rate faced by any particular locality for any particular program would then be higher the greater the degree of central interest and the lower the (expected) degree of local enthusiasm (price-elasticity) and ability (income-elasticity) to support that program. The exact structure of the final formula for any service could likely be determined only after a period-perhaps a prolonged period-of trial and error, of observing the results of formulas, such as those now in place, and adjusting them as necessary to approximate more closely to the (centrally) desired outcomes. Unfortunately, nowhere in the world does there appear to be evidence of such an iterative approach at work nor is there much evidence anywhere of research that is helpful in designtng matching rates.44
Achieving Political Goals
Finally, even the purest analyst of intergovernmental fiscal relations must deal with the reality of political transfers. It may be necessary, for example, to transfer some resources to jurisdictions that do tnot, strictly speaking, need them in order to make it politically feasible to transfer needed amounts to other jurisdictions4' It may also be essential to transfer resources simply in order to keep some economically nonviable local governments alive for political reasons--to salvage regional pride, to provide jobs for local supporters, or for some other reason.46
From an economic perspective, what is important is minimizing any collateral damage in the course of achieving the political ends of transfers. For example, transfers that simply finance local deficits or that are entirely discretionary in nature are invariably bad from the perspective taken here.
On the other hand, it may be quite sensible for central governments in effect to make individual contracts with particular local governments-though preferably for a period of years rather than on an annual basis and preferably in an open and agreed fashion. Given the diversity of many countries and the usual political necessity to have nominally uniform laws, only such a contract approach may be able to provide the necessarily nonuniform terms needed to secure the desired outcomes at least cost. The design and limits of such "asymmetrical fiscal federalism" have, unfortunately, so far received little attention. In any case, as with the design of governments, an optimal system of transfers might appear on the surface to be as complex, diverse, and apparently arbitrary as the transfers that actually exist in many countries. But the complexity and diversity would almost certainly be quite different in character from that found in practice, and the system would be both more transparent and predictable.
Conclusions
In this paper I have covered so much ground so rapidly, and to some extent in such a cavalier fashion, that it may be useful to conclude by recapitulating briefly the main points I have tried to make. The first point is simply that it is critical to understand clearly the objectives and context of fiscal decentralization in any country before analyzing any component of the process. I assume here that, in the usual (nonfederal) case, the primary objective is to improve efficiency and that the appropriate per-221 spective to adopt is that of the central government. In reality, of course, other objectives, and other perspectives, are often relevant and need to be taken into account. Nonetheless, I would argue that the more or less standard economic approach suggested here is still likely to provide the best starting point in most cases.
Given this starting point, I then limit the discussion to two of the principal public finance problems that invariably come up when fiscal decentralization is discussedassigning local revenues and designing intergovernmental transfers. From the efficiency perspective, I argue that local revenues should clearly be as benefit-related as possible. To the extent local public services can be financed from user charges and specific benefit taxes, they should be. Moreover, local general taxes should also be considered primarily from a benefit perspective. Property taxes have some attractions from this perspective, but local income taxes levied in the form of proportional surcharges on central taxes look even better in many instances, subject in both cases to limits on the ability of local governments to export tax burdens (unmatched by benefits) to nonresidents.
As for intergovernmental transfers, I argue that not only are such transfers almost invariably necessary in practice if local governments are responsible for significant expenditures but that a good case can generally be made for some degree of capacity equalizatron. On the other hand, I suggest that (apart from the federal case which is not discussed here) such transfers should always be conditioned on local expenditure performance.
Finally, I should stress two important caveats. The first is simply to emphasize that, even with all the footnotes and asides, many issues and qualifications that may be critical in particular circumstances have not been adequately discussed here. I have attempted only to sketch one possible way into, and out of, the intergovernmental fiscal labyrinth that has proven helpful in practice in a number of very different circumstances. Mapping the entire maze in to that available In the trenches.
Such rnapmaking is the essential role economic theory, and much of what of I have said is, of course, based in large part on the work of the many have vvorked on these fine theorists who issues. Nonetheless, the second caveat I would like to emphasize is sirnply that there are few issues in fiscal practice which require more specific institutional knowledge than those related to fiscal federalism. 'The approach I have suggested ' See Bahl .and Ltrr (1992) and Shah (1091) for examples ' For other recent collecttorls of pqers on this topic, see Prud'homme (1991) and Owens and Panella (1991) 3 See Boaclway (1992), Fallis (1992). and 4 See, for example, Ladd and Yinger (1989) and Downes and Pogue (1992) In addition, there has been conslderable Interest recently at thl? supranatronal level In tax harmonlzation (Kopits, 1992) as well as in a wider range of traditional fiscal federalism issues (Walsh, 1992) Wlldasln (1986) and Rubrnfeld (1987) , see also Oates (1990 Oates ( , 1991 For those Interested, much of the experience on which I draw has been set out In more detail in other works see, for example, on developed countries-Bird (1986) and Bird and Slack (1991, 1993) , on developing countnes- Bird (1980 Bird ( , 1984 Bird ( , 1990 ; and on the countries In transltron-- Bird and Walllch (1993) ' Where applicable-a point discussed briefly In the followtng section on federal finance and fiscal federallsm--"loCal" IS to be read throughout as encompa:,slng "state and Tax Journal Vol. 46, no. 2, (June, 1993), pp. 207-27 I SYMPOSIUM ON FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION lo For a recent example of the appkcatlon of agency theory to fiscal decentralization, see Ferris and Wrnkler (1991) " Note that locally determined distributrve policy may as well act against as In support of centrally determined policy. As Tresch (1981) and Boadway and Flatters (1982) have emphasized see Bird (1984a) and (1989); incidentally, the latter paper also attempts to drstinguish more clearly between polltlcal unions (federations) and economic unions (e g , common markets).
l3 Bird (1986) partures from marglnal-cost pnc'ng) that need to be taken 'nto account In practice for extensive dIscussIon of local service pnc'ng In various areas, see Mushkin (1971) . Bird (1976) . and Bailey (1988) 23 For an example, see the analys's of development charges
In Canada In Slack and Bird (1991) 24 In a few countrtes that have suffered h'gh Inflation, Hunter (1977) and, for a considerably more sophlstlcateci approach, Hettich and Wlner (1986) 3s Dlfferentlals In the cost of providing services may or may not be t&en Into account Note that It IS Important to dlstlngulsh fiscal capacity equallzatlon (among jurisdlctlons) from conslderatlons of honzontal equity (among Indlvlduals) thl? two are not necessarily connected. The dlscussion here concerns only the former For dIscussIon of an efflclcrlcy argument for equallzatlon (In the sense of horizontal equity among Indlvlduals rather than capacity equallzatlcin among lunsdlctlons) that does not fit wtthln the framework adopted here, see Boadway and Flatters (1982) and Musgrave and Musgrave (1993) 36 Originally developed under the auspices of the ACIR (1962), this approach has for 35 years been the foundation of thr, extensive Canadlall federal-provlnclal equallzatlon system (Boadway, 1980) although not without cntlcism (Coul'chene, 1984; Bird snd Slack, 1990) " The only exception IS when the positive transfers required to bring those below the average up to the average are financed by negative transfers from those above the average (as 111 the fmanzausgleh of Germany ,gnd the slmllar system lr lenmark) More generally, the effects of any grant systflm are obviously determlned In part by how the grants are financed (Musgrave, 1961) , but this Important questton cannot be dlscussed further here 38 Such servil-es could, of course, also be provided centrally, but It is ,issurned here that It has been determined to be admlnlstratlvely or polltlcally advisable to provide them at the local Iflvel 3g On the other hand, It IS probably not advls,jble to include explicit measures of fiscal effort in such formulas for a number 01 reasons First, the measurement of fiscal effort IS conslderably more complex than usually seems to be realized (Bird and Slack, 1990 is more difficult to achieve (Bird, 1976a) The problem giving rise to the need for equallzatlon In the first place IS that the capacity (tax base) of poor areas IS too low not that their tax rates are too low lmposlng an additlonal penalty on poor locallttes In a transfer program that almost invariably falls far short of equallzlng fiscal capacity seems hard to justify. Third. includmg actual tax rates in the formula undesirably opens It to gaming by reclplents (Courchene, 1984) a Gramllch (1977, p. 222) February, 1993 
